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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-1403 
 ___________ 
 
 JACK J. MINICONE, JR., 
        Appellant 
 v. 
 
 ROBERT WERLINGER, WARDEN F.C.I. LORETTO
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 3-10-cv-00095) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Kim R. Gibson 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
 or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
April 29, 2011 
 Before:  MCKEE, Chief Judge, ALDISERT and WEIS,  Circuit Judges 
  
 (Opinion filed: June 3, 2011) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
  As we write for the parties, we will limit our recitation of the facts 
underlying this appeal.  Jack Minicone, Jr., a federal prisoner serving a term of 
incarceration imposed by United States District Court for the Northern District of New 
York, argues in a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition that sentencing counsel was ineffective for 
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failing to argue for a lower sentence based on an amendment to the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines—and, further, because the same counsel represented Minicone in 
his first 28 U.S.C. § 2255 action in the Northern District of New York,
1
 that he should be 
allowed to file in this Circuit via § 2241, as counsel could not have been expected to raise 
an ineffectiveness claim against himself.  Minicone avers that § 2255 is thus ―inadequate 
and ineffective,‖ see 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), and that its application to his situation would 
render AEDPA an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.  The District 
Court denied the petition.   
  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  In reviewing the denial 
of a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition, we ―exercise plenary review over the District Court’s 
legal conclusions and apply a clearly erroneous standard to its findings of fact.‖  See 
O’Donald v. Johns, 402 F.3d 172, 173 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005); see also United States v. 
Friedland, 83 F.3d 1531, 1542 (3d Cir. 1996) (―Our review of the district court’s order 
denying . . .  relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is plenary.‖).   
  As a basic matter, Minicone is not correct in his assertions of either § 
2255’s ineffectiveness or its as-applied unconstitutionality.  There is no constitutional 
right to counsel in collateral proceedings.  See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 
(1987); Virgin Islands v. Warner, 48 F.3d 688, 692 (3d Cir. 1995).  Thus, errors by 
counsel in collateral proceedings—and, by extension, ―conflicts of interest‖ of this sort—
do not implicate the Sixth Amendment.  If Minicone believed counsel to be ineffective at 
                                                 
1
 Minicone v. United States, No. 5:97-cv-00519 (N.D.N.Y. 1997). 
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the time of his first collateral attack, he had the options of retaining alternative counsel or 
proceeding pro se.  His decision to proceed with original counsel, and the consequences 
deriving therefrom, do not implicate a constitutional failure in the implementation of 
AEDPA.      
  Moreover, it is well settled that ―[m]otions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 
are the presumptive means by which federal prisoners can challenge their convictions or 
sentences that are allegedly in violation of the Constitution.‖  Okereke v. United States, 
307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002).  The 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) ―safety valve‖ exception 
applies only if ―remedy by [§ 2255] motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality 
of . . . detention.‖  28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).  Inadequacy is not presumed simply because 
procedural requirements present an impediment to filing, as is the case here.  See Cradle 
v. United States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538–39 (3d Cir. 2002).2  Rather, proper use 
of the § 2255(e) as a method for invoking § 2241 is limited to rare circumstances, such as 
when a petitioner ―had no earlier opportunity to challenge his conviction for a crime that 
an intervening change in substantive law [negated].‖  See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 
251 (3d Cir. 1997). 
  Here, Minicone had a full and fair opportunity to raise ineffectiveness 
claims in his first 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, and was on notice via the plain language of 
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 Indeed, Minicone has filed multiple § 2255 motions, as well as motions for resentencing 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).  See generally Minicone v. United States, 353 F. Supp. 2d 
316, 319 (N.D.N.Y. 2005); Minicone v. United States, No. 01-CV-1969, 2002 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 4012 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2002).  
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the statute that successive attempts to attack his conviction or sentence would be subject 
to the heightened AEDPA bar.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h).  And since he is not prevented 
from pursuing a § 2255 motion, ―habeas corpus relief is unavailable.‖  Application of 
Galante, 437 F.2d 1164, 1165 (3d Cir. 1971) (per curiam).   
  As no substantial issue is before us, we will invoke our authority under 
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 to summarily affirm the judgment of the District 
Court.  See United States v. Rhines, ___ F.3d ___, slip op. at 3 (3d Cir. Apr. 4, 2011, No. 
10-4077).  Appellee’s motion for summary action, to the extent that it requests 
independent relief, is denied as unnecessary.   
 
